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INTER PARTES REVIEW AND FEDERAL 
LITIGATION: PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS 
AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS 
STEPHEN N. KULHANEK† 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you own the patent on an incredible invention. 
You learn that someone is infringing on your patent by 
recreating and selling your invention without your permission. 
The infringer refuses to enter into a licensing agreement with 
you, so you sue for infringement.  The trial is long and expensive, 
but you emerge victorious with a giant monetary judgment. 
However, during the course of the trial, the infringer petitioned 
the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“PTAB”) for an inter partes 
review (“IPR”) challenging the validity of the most vital claims in 
your patent.  Once the PTAB instituted IPR, the infringer moved 
for the district court judge to stay litigation pending the PTAB’s 
final judgment as to patent validity, but the judge denied the 
stay, resulting in parallel proceedings.  The PTAB ends up ruling 
against you, eviscerating your patent by invalidating its essential 
claims, leaving you stuck with two conflicting judgments.  You do 
not know which judgment stands, and either result significantly 
impacts your life. 
This nightmare is a very real possibility.  In 2011, Congress 
passed the America Invents Act (“AIA”), which created IPR 
procedures.  Congress intended for IPR to serve as an alternative 
to federal litigation in which a party seeks to invalidate a patent 
in a quick, inexpensive proceeding before the PTAB.  However, 
IPR uses more relaxed standards than litigation for claim 
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construction and burden of proof, giving IPR a petitioner-friendly 
appearance.  This has made IPR very popular, resulting in a high 
patent invalidation rate. 
This Note addresses IPR’s impact on the patent system and 
what further changes Congress should consider making.  Part I 
discusses the patent system leading up to the enactment of the 
AIA.  Part II explains the details of IPR, its statistics, and an 
example of IPR in practice.  Part III proposes some further 
alterations Congress could make to help IPR become a more 
beneficial proceeding. 
I. THE PATENT LANDSCAPE BEFORE THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT
The United States patent system is rooted in the United
States Constitution, which authorizes Congress to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”1  Congress exercised this 
constitutional power by enacting the Patent Act, which created 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).2  The 
patent system is founded on the premise that awarding a limited 
monopoly for inventions mutually benefits inventors and the 
public.3 
The PTO reviews patent applications to ensure five 
requirements are met before issuing a patent: (1) the invention is 
patentable subject matter;4 (2) the invention is useful;5 (3) the 
invention has not been preceded in identical form in the public 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012). 
3 See History & Background, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www. 
uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/support-centers/patent-and-trademark-resource-
centers-ptrc/history-and-0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“In return for full public 
disclosure, a U.S. patent offers certain rights to an inventor for up to twenty years, 
during which time the inventor may exclude all others from making, using, 
importing or selling his or her invention. The patent is published and disseminated 
to the public so that others may study the invention and improve upon it. The 
constant evolution of science and technology, spurred by the monetary incentive the 
U.S. patent system offers to inventors, strengthens our nation's economy. New 
inventions lead to new technologies, create new jobs, and improve our quality of 
life.”). 
4 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
5 Id. (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
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prior art;6 (4) the invention represents a nontrivial extension of 
what is known;7 and (5) the invention is disclosed and described 
by the applicant in such a way as to enable others to make and 
use the invention.8 
Patents are made up of specifications and claims, among 
other components.9  A specification is a written description of the 
invention that names all the components of the invention, 
describes how they work, and illustrates how they work together 
to perform the invention’s function.10  A claim, often referred to 
as the heart of a patent, states the precise legal definition of the 
invention.11  A claim defines the boundaries of the property rights 
that a patent will confer on an inventor.12  Thus, claims are 
analogous to the “metes and bounds” description of a real 
property deed.13 
The process of acquiring a patent from the PTO is known as 
“prosecution.”  The average prosecution lasts about 2.77 years.14  
Prosecution begins when an inventor files a patent application.15  
There is a three-step review process: first, by one of seventeen 
main examining groups; second, by a specific “art unit” 
specializing in the relevant technology; and third, by one of the 
PTO’s patent examiners.16  The examiner conducts an initial 
6 Id. § 102 (describing the novelty requirement of patentability). Prior art is a 
reference that is sufficiently described so that the public can be said to be in 
possession of the reference, such as sufficiently labeled pictures and drawings. See, 
e.g., MPEP § 2121.04 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Aug. 2012).
7 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (describing the nonobviousness requirement of
patentability). 
8 Id. § 112 (describing the enablement requirement of patentability). 
9 A more detailed discussion of the components of a patent is not relevant to this 
note. 
10 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(a) (2013). 
11 MPEP § 1824 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). 
12 Id. 
13 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 129 (6th ed. 2012). 
14 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2000). 
15 See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.53 (2015). 
16 MERGES, supra note 13, at 191. Generally, at least fourteen months pass 
before a patent examiner actually picks up an initial application. Id. at 191–92. 
During this period, applicants may file additional papers, such as an information 
disclosure statement, which describes the prior art known to the applicant at the 
time of filing, or preliminary amendments, which are changes made to the 
application before the patent examiner’s first “office action,” or response. Id. at 192. 
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review of the application, including a search of the prior art.17  
After the initial review, the examiner usually rejects most of the 
claims in the application, often for reasons of obviousness or lack 
of novelty.18 
Applicants can amend their applications during prosecution; 
“the most common reason [applicants amend] is to respond to a 
rejection or other office action.”19  Generally, amendments are 
permitted until the examiner issues a final rejection.20  However, 
“final rejection” is a misnomer because an applicant can respond 
to a final rejection, typically by filing a continuation21 or by 
amending after final rejection.22 
Generally, patent applications are published eighteen 
months after their filing date.23  Publication grants the applicant 
a limited version of the exclusionary right that accompanies a 
patent if the patent ultimately issues.24  Publication also notifies 
interested third parties who are permitted to submit prior art 
references to be included in the prosecution file of the 
17 MPEP § 904 (9th ed. Rev. 7, July 2015). 
18 MERGES, supra note 13, at 192. The examiner must state the reasons for each 
rejection and provide the applicant with information and references to aid in 
deciding the desirability of continuing prosecution. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012). 
19 MERGES, supra note 13, at 192. (“[A]pplicants can also correct mistakes, add 
or change drawings, and update the disclosure portion of the specification.”); see also 
37 C.F.R. § 1.121(b) (2015). 
20 MERGES, supra note 13, at 192. 
21 “Filing a continuation resets the examination process” and has several 
variations. Id. A simple continuation essentially acts as an amendment because it 
“retains the benefit of the initial application’s filing date.” Id. A continuation-in-part 
adds new matter to the specification that does not “retain the benefit of the earlier 
filing date.” Id. at 192–93. Another variation of continuation involves filing an 
amendment after final rejection “when the examiner has decided to allow some 
claims but has issued a final rejection as to others.” Id. at 193. Essentially, this 
allows the applicant to acquire a patent on the acceptable claims while still battling 
over the rejected claims. Id. Additionally, applicants can communicate directly with 
patent examiners through an examiner interview. Id. 
22 Id. at 192; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 (2015). Additionally, if the applicant 
believes there to be clear disagreements with the examiner, he or she may file an 
appeal to the PTAB. 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2012). 
23 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012). However, applications that are provisional, no 
longer pending, subject to government secrecy orders, or for design patents do not 
get published. Id. at (b)(2)(A). 
24 MERGES, supra note 13, at 193. This limited right allows the applicant to 
“recover a reasonable royalty from an infringer,” provided that the “infringer has 
actual notice of the published patent application” and “the claims in the published 
application are ‘substantially identical’ to the claims in the patent when issued.” Id. 
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application.25  Additionally, significant third party participation 
is permitted through various administrative procedures 
established by the AIA.26 
Prosecution ends when the PTO grants the patent, when all 
appeals are exhausted after final rejection, or when the applicant 
abandons the patent application.27  Issued patents are made 
available to the public through publication in the Patent 
Gazette.28 
Throughout the history of the patent system, Congress has 
worked to reduce the quantity of “low-level” or “weak” patents.29  
Many of these reforms were founded on the belief that additional 
and more rigorous procedures in the PTO would improve patent 
quality, thereby bolstering the integrity of the patent system 
through an increase in both the public and the patent owner’s 
confidence in the system.30 
Congress’s attempts at patent system reform have led to the 
creation of post-issuance review proceedings that allow patent 
challengers additional and easier opportunities to invalidate 
patents.31  In 1980, Congress created the process of ex parte 
reexamination, the first of these post-issuance review 
proceedings.32  Ex parte reexamination permitted any member of 
the public to request that the PTO take a “second look” at a 
patent at any time during the life of the patent.33  This type of 
post-issuance review proceeding failed to achieve Congress’s 
goals; ex parte reexamination was often employed multiple times 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 194. IPR is one of these administrative procedures. See infra Section 
II.A.
27 MERGES, supra note 13, at 194. However, prosecution can potentially
continue after issuance of a patent through a reissue. Id. A patentee can seek a 
reissue of a patent if he comes to believe that the patent claims are either too broad 
or too narrow, but reissues to broaden the scope of the patent claims must be 
initiated within two years of the original issuance. Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 881 (2015). 
30 See id. at 882 (citing Patent Policy: Hearing on H.R. 4564 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1982) (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks); 126 CONG. REC. 29895 (1980) (statement 
of Rep. Kastenmeier)). 
31 Dolin, supra note 29, at 883. 
32 See Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)). 
33 Dolin, supra note 29, at 884. 
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against the same patent, resulting in confusion among patent 
owners and the public as to the existence and scope of patent 
rights, and ex parte reexamination did not eliminate many 
patents because most patent claims survived the process either 
fully confirmed or moderately amended.34 
In 1999, Congress enacted another alternative post-issuance 
review proceeding called inter partes reexamination.35  Inter 
partes reexamination was created under the belief that 
“providing third parties with more opportunities for substantive 
participation during the reexamination proceeding”36 would 
“build confidence in the reexamination process so that third 
parties [would] be inclined to raise patent challenges in this 
forum rather than through litigation.”37  However, even with this 
additional post-issuance review proceeding, the reexamination 
process failed, in several ways, to fulfill its purpose of providing a 
more affordable, faster, and expert alternative to litigation.38 
First, the reexamination proceedings only focused on the 
novelty and obviousness requirements for patentability.39  
Because federal litigation can analyze any grounds of invalidity, 
“the reexamination process simply bifurcate[d] the dispute for 
resolution in two different fora.”40 
Second, the reexamination proceedings and federal litigation 
had no preclusive effect on each other with respect to the patent 
challenger.41  Thus, the patent challenger could lose in one venue 
and challenge the patent again in the other venue, but the patent 
owner need only lose in one venue for his claims to be 
permanently invalidated.42 
34 Id. 
35 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 
1501 (codified in relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2006)) (repealed 2012). 
36 THE ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT LAW REFORM: A REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14 (Aug. 1992), http://perma.cc/S29S-9BBS. 
37 Id. 
38 Dolin, supra note 29, at 902–03. 
39 Id. at 903. 
40 Id. at 884. 
41 Id. at 903–04 (citing In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2012)). 
42 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 
(1971). 
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Third, the reexamination proceedings were not binding on 
each other.43  While the reexamination process was meant to give 
the PTO a second look at a patent, the statute allowed unlimited 
looks, “with the PTO empowered to reexamine the patent 
multiple times with each subsequent decision to proceed to 
reexamination and the conduct of reexamination itself not bound 
by the result of previous reexamination processes.”44  The lack of 
estoppel provisions between reexamination and litigation, and 
especially between multiple reexamination proceedings, further 
increased any uncertainty in the strength and quality of issued 
patents.45 
Fourth, the lack of estoppel provisions between these 
proceedings increased potential costs by requiring participants to 
pay for both proceedings.46  Patent owners were hurt more by the 
increased costs because a patent can be subject to unlimited 
reexaminations, resulting in a snowball effect.47 
Finally, the reexamination process failed to resolve disputes 
faster than litigation because the average length of a 
reexamination proceeding was nearly equal to that of litigation.48  
Once again, because reexamination proceedings were not a 
substitute for litigation, the time spent in reexamination often 
compounded the time spent in litigation.49 
These flaws in the reexamination process gave patent 
challengers the “opportunity to continuously cast doubt on 
legitimate patent claims and to ‘blackmail’ patent holders into 
lower royalty rates.”50  Congress enacted the AIA to better reform 
the patent system by creating different mechanisms for 
eliminating weak patents and, arguably, it has been successful in 
these early years.51 
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012). 
44 Dolin, supra note 29, at 904–05. 
45 Id. at 908–09. 
46 See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying 
rehearing en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[R]eexamination after a patent has 
been sustained in court is a multiplier of cost, delay, and uncertainty . . . .”). 
47 Dolin, supra note 29, at 906. 
48 Id. at 907–08. 
49 Id. at 908. 
50 Id. at 909. 
51 See Colleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design 
of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that 
patent invalidation is a public good and that post-grant reviews, such as IPRs, can 
reduce uncertainty over the boundaries and validity of granted patents). 
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II. A CLOSE LOOK AT INTER PARTES REVIEW AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS 
This Part examines the details of IPR proceedings, discusses 
the statistics concerning such proceedings, and provides an 
example of IPR in practice. 
A. The America Invents Act and the Creation of Inter Partes
Review
In 2011, Congress reformed the patent law landscape by
passing the America Invents Act.52  Among other changes, the 
AIA created a new type of proceeding: inter partes review.53  The 
AIA also established the PTAB, which is the PTO’s 
administrative tribunal, composed of administrative patent 
judges who are charged with rendering decisions on appeals from 
adverse examiner decisions, post-issuance challenges to patents, 
and interferences.54  IPR was created as a less expensive and 
quicker alternative to federal litigation, in which a third party 
challenges the validity of a patent before the PTAB.55  The 
differences between federal litigation and IPR illustrate some 
issues that arise from offering IPR as an alternative to federal 
litigation. 
Standing to institute an IPR poses almost no obstacle to a 
petitioner.  Any person who is not the owner of a patent may 
petition the PTO for an IPR of the patent within one year of 
service of a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.56  
However, any party who has filed a civil action in a federal 
district court challenging the validity of a patent is barred from 
petitioning for an IPR of the patent.57  But this bar does not 
extend to counterclaims challenging the validity of a patent.58   
52 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
53 35 U.S.C.A. § 311(a) (West 2014). 
54 Id. § 6(a), (b). 
55 See Patrick Doody, Post-Grant Proceedings: The Year Behind and the Year 
Ahead, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/475387/ 
post-grant-proceedings-the-year-behind-and-the-year-ahead (last visited Mar. 5, 
2017). 
56 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b) (2012). 
57 Id. § 42.101(a). 
58 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(3) (2012). 
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Thus, the standing requirement for IPR is much more relaxed 
than Article III standing required by federal courts for all cases, 
including patent validity challenges.59 
To institute an IPR of a patent, a petitioner must file after 
the later of either nine months after issuance of the patent or, if 
a post-grant review (“PGR”)60 is instituted, termination of such 
PGR.61  Petitions for IPR must identify each challenged claim and 
show how prior art, such as patents and printed publications, 
invalidates the claims as un-patentable under either 
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103, which require that patents are novel and 
nonobvious.62  Petitioners must take care to include all 
arguments in the petition, because they cannot advance different 
arguments later in the proceeding.63 
After the petitioner files for IPR, the patent owner has three 
months to file an optional preliminary response stating why an 
IPR should not be instituted.64  At the end of the preliminary 
response period, the PTAB has three months to decide whether to 
59 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted) (“[A]t an irreducible 
minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show that 
he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,’ and that the injury ‘fairly can be traced 
to the challenged action’ and ‘is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ”). 
60 Another creation of the AIA, PGR was enacted to make the U.S. patent 
issuance process similar to its European counterpart. See Filip De Corte et al., AIA 
Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They Work in Tandem, or Rather 
Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 96–97 (2012). Any person 
who is not a patent owner may file a PGR request challenging the patent on any 
ground of invalidity. 35 U.S.C. § 321(a), (b) (2012). A petitioner may only file a PGR 
request within nine months of the patent issue or reissue date. Id. § 321(c). Once the 
PTO institutes a PGR proceeding, the PTAB has twelve months to render its final 
decision. Id. § 326(a)(11). Additional details about PGRs are not relevant for the 
purpose of this Note. 
61 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a) (2013). 
62 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2012). Challenges based on novelty and obviousness are 
the top two reasons for invalidating claims in litigation. See John R. Allison & Mark 
A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J.
185, 209 (1998) (noting that in federal cases where anticipation—no novelty—was
raised in defense, courts invalidated 40.7% of patents, and where obviousness was
raised in defense, courts invalidated 36.3% of patents).
63 See Ryan Davis, 4 Mistakes That Can Doom AIA Petitions, LAW360 (Aug. 25, 
2014, 5:49 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/570192/4-mistakes-that-can-doom-
aia-petitions (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
64 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a), (b) (2016). New testimonial evidence, such as affidavits, 
and claim amendments are excluded from the preliminary response. Id. § 42.107(c), 
(d). However, the patent owner may disclaim one or more claims in the patent to 
prevent an IPR on those claims. Id. § 42.107(e). 
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institute an IPR.65  An IPR may only be instituted if the 
information presented in the petition and any response “shows 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would 
prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in 
the petition.”66 
Once an IPR is instituted, the PTAB has one year to reach 
its final determination.67  IPRs are generally completed within 
eighteen months of filing the petition.  However, two exceptions 
exist.  First, the PTAB can extend the one-year review period, by 
not more than six months, upon a showing of “good cause.”68  
Second, the PTAB “may adjust the time periods” if several 
proceedings are joined together.69  Therefore, IPRs can 
potentially settle patent disputes on a more timely basis than 
federal litigation.70 
Moreover, the cost of an IPR is significantly lower than 
federal litigation, which can easily cost several million dollars.71  
The IPR fee is $23,000.72  Additionally, IPRs require $200 for 
each claim in excess of twenty during the request phase and $400 
for each claim in excess of fifteen during the review phase of the 
proceeding.73  However, if the PTAB declines the petition for IPR, 
the PTO will issue a refund of $14,000.74  Also, the quicker 
adjudication time means that the parties owe less in attorney’s 
fees, resulting in a total IPR cost of roughly $300,000 per side.75  
Thus, IPR is certainly a more economically feasible option when 
compared to federal litigation. 
The IPR proceeding itself is conducted like a streamlined 
trial, with the parties engaging in discovery, motions, and 
arguments.76  First, the patent owner is granted a three-month 
65 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2012). 
66 Id. § 314(a). 
67 Id. § 316(a)(11). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Sylvia Hsieh, More Patent Cases Are Being Taken on Contingency Fee 
Basis, NEW ENGLAND IN-HOUSE (July 26, 2006), http://newenglandinhouse.com/ 
2006/07/26/more-patent-cases-taken-on-contingent-fee-basis/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2017) (“An average patent case will . . . take two to three years to litigate.”). 
71 Id. 
72 37 C.F.R. § 42.15(a)(1)–(2) (2015). 
73 Id. § 42.15(a)(3)–(4). 
74 Id. § 42.15(a)(2). 
75 See Chien & Helmers, supra note 51, at 12. 
76 See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756-01, 48,757 (Aug. 
14, 2012) (displaying a representative timeline of the proceeding). 
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discovery period.77  The patent owner must file a response to the 
petition within these three months.78  During this time, the 
patent owner may file a motion to amend the patent claims at 
issue.79  Next, the petitioner is granted a three-month discovery 
period.80  After this period, the petitioner must file a reply brief to 
the patent owner’s response, as well as an opposition to any 
claim amendments.81  The patent owner then has a one-month 
period for further discovery and briefing.82  After the discovery 
periods end, the parties may request an oral hearing to present 
their arguments and live testimony before the PTAB.83  Finally, 
the PTAB issues its final decision sometime after the oral 
hearing but before the end of the statutory review period.84 
At the beginning of an IPR proceeding, the PTAB issues a 
claim construction regarding the patent claims at issue.85  Also 
known as a claim interpretation, this defines the scope and 
meaning of a claim.86  Claim construction is very important for 
determining whether prior art invalidates a patent claim, and 
this area represents a key difference between IPR proceedings 
and federal litigation.  In the federal district courts, claims are 
given their ordinary meaning by reference to what a person 
having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) would 
understand.87  However, during IPR proceedings, claims are 
given their “broadest reasonable construction.”88  While claims 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. Such an amendment “may not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent 
or introduce new matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3) (2012). Also, the patent owner has 
the burden to show written-description support in the original disclosure for each 
added or amended claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(b)(1) (2015). 
80 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,757–58. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 48,757. 
83 Id. at 48,757–58, 48,768. 
84 Id. at 48,757, 48,768. 
85 See Scott A. McKeown, Early PTAB Claim Construction - The Faster, Cheaper 
Markman Order, PATENTS POST-GRANT (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.patentspostgrant. 
com/lang/en/2013/10/early-ptab-claim-construction-to-drive-litigation-settlements 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
86 Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1247–48 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
87 See, e.g., L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–19 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 
88 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016). 
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are still interpreted according to a PHOSITA’s understanding,89 
the broadest reasonable construction standard is broader than 
the federal district court standard.  “The broader the claim 
construction, the more likely it is to sweep prior art within its 
ambit,” thus, making it much easier for patent challengers to 
prevail in an IPR.90  After issuing its claim construction, the 
PTAB determines whether the challenged patent claims are 
invalid.91 
Additionally, IPR proceedings differ from federal litigation in 
terms of the chosen evidentiary standard for patent invalidity. 
In the federal district courts, the party challenging the validity of 
a patent claim must prove invalidity by clear and convincing 
evidence.92  However, in IPR proceedings, the petitioner must 
prove invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence.93  Because 
IPR uses a relaxed evidentiary standard, the potential exists for 
inconsistent rulings where a patent claim is held invalid by the 
PTAB, but held valid by a federal district court judge.94 
After the completion of an IPR, the petitioner is estopped 
from asserting any ground that was “raised or reasonably could 
have [been] raised” before the PTAB.95  This estoppel attaches 
from the date of the PTAB’s “final written decision.”96  Also, this 
estoppel applies to proceedings before the federal district courts, 
the International Trade Commission, and the PTO.97  However, 
because the validity of patent claims can only be challenged on 
novelty and obviousness grounds in an IPR, this estoppel does 
not prevent a challenger from attacking a patent in multiple 
forums.  This essentially gives the challenger two “bite[s] at the 
89 See Captioncall, L.L.C., v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2013-00543, 2015 WL 981641, at 
*5–6 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2015).
90 Dolin, supra note 29, at 916. 
91 Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, 2014 WL 824156, at *6 
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2014). 
92 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (“We consider 
whether [35 U.S.C.] § 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence. We hold that it does.”). 
93 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012). 
94 See David L. McCombs et al., Federal Circuit Appeals from the PTAB: A New 
Game or Just the Same Old Practice?, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 240, 246 
(2013) (discussing different standards of review for invalidity determinations and 
the implications for the Federal Circuit). 
95 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at § 315(e)(2). 
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apple.”  Moreover, this “estoppel provision[] [is] claim . . . specific, 
[thus,] subsequent IPR requests can be brought . . . against the 
same patent.”98 
B. The Statistics Relating to Inter Partes Review Proceedings
Since IPR became available on September 16, 2012,99 it has
become increasingly popular.  Seventeen petitions were filed in 
the first few days in fiscal year 2012, 514 petitions were filed in 
fiscal year 2013, and 1,310 petitions were filed in fiscal year 
2014.100  During the first twenty-nine months of availability, 
approximately 2,300 petitions for IPR were filed.101  Of the 
petitions it has reviewed, the PTO ordered around eighty percent 
into trial.102 
As of January 18, 2015, the PTAB has conducted 163 IPRs 
through completion.103  The results of these IPRs break down as 
follows: all claims were cancelled in 121 cases, some claims were 
cancelled and some claims were upheld—a split decision—in 18 
cases, and all claims were upheld in 24 cases.104  Thus, the PTAB 
has invalidated nearly seventy-five percent of the claims 
challenged through IPR proceedings.105  In contrast, the 
invalidation rate in the federal district courts is only about forty-
two percent.106  However, this figure is misleading because in 
federal litigation patents can be invalidated on more grounds 
than novelty or obviousness.107  When focused on patents 
invalidated on novelty or obviousness grounds, the invalidation 
rate in federal district courts drops to just over one-third.108 
98 Dolin, supra note 29, at 928–29. 
99 Inter Partes Disputes, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto. 
gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act-aia/inter-partes-disputes (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
100 Patent Trial and Appeal Board AIA Progress: Statistics (as of 01/01/2015), 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 1 http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/aia_ 
statistics_1_1_2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
101 See Patent Trial and Appeal Board AIA Progress: Statistics (as of 
01/08/2015), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 1, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/aia_statistics_01_08_2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
102 Id. at 2. 
103 Dolin, supra note 29, at 926. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent 
Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1787 (2014). 
107 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012). 
108 Allison & Lemley, supra note 62, at 209. 
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Although supporters of the current IPR standards may 
consider the high patent invalidation rate as proof that the PTAB 
is successfully culling weak patents, this argument is undercut 
by the PTAB’s use of a lower evidentiary standard and broader 
claim construction than those used by the federal district courts. 
Additionally, the high invalidation rate is not surprising given 
that the PTAB can only institute an IPR when the petitioner has 
shown a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one 
challenged claim.  Thus, the high invalidation rate can be viewed 
as essentially a “reflection of the PTAB’s ability to forecast 
correctly how it will decide on at least one claim.”109  However, 
this “selection mechanism”110 is controlled by the lower standards 
used in IPR, so the existence of the high invalidation rate does 
not necessarily mean that only weak patents are being 
invalidated.  Even if every invalidated patent were a weak 
patent, this does not justify using lower standards.  Surely, a 
truly weak patent would not survive review under the district 
court standards.111  Additionally, a closer look at the statistics 
may cast further doubt on the belief that only weak patents are 
being invalidated. 
First, some of the patents in this early stage of IPR have 
already survived litigation, reexamination, or both.112  More 
specifically, fifteen percent of these patents have previously 
survived reexamination—meaning that the patent claims at 
issue were reconfirmed—under the PTO’s preponderance of the 
evidence standard and broadest reasonable claim construction.113   
109 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money: 
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV 235, 253 (2015). 
110 Chien & Helmers, supra note 51, at 5. 
111 This may explain the not insignificant invalidation rate in the district courts. 
112 Dolin, supra note 29, at 927. 
113 Id. 
2016] INTER PARTES REVIEW AND FEDERAL LITIGATION 1107 
Moreover, these patents account for over eight percent of IPR 
final decisions.114  These specific decisions result in a per claim 
invalidation rate of eighty-three percent.115 
Additionally, it seems that the PTAB awards no deference to 
the consideration of prior art references by the patent examiner 
during the patent prosecution process.  Thirty-one percent of IPR 
petitions relied only on new—previously unconsidered—prior art, 
three percent relied only on old art—previously considered and 
found not to be invalidating—and sixty-six percent relied on a 
combination of old and new prior art.116  Based on prior art 
references, the IPR final written decisions result in the following 
invalidation rates: ninety-three percent where the petition relied 
only on new prior art, ninety-three percent where the petition 
relied only on old prior art, and eighty-one percent where the 
petition relied on a combination of old and new prior art.117 
Finally, the PTAB’s treatment of motions to amend claims 
leads to the conclusion that this ability of the patent owner is 
“merely illusory.”118  The opportunity for patent owners to move 
to amend claims is an advantage that IPR proceedings offer over 
federal district court litigation.119  However, patent owners have 
only filed motions to amend claims in fifty cases,120 and the PTAB 
114 Id. This difference between the percentages of patents reviewed and those 
that reached final decision is likely attributable to settlements that resulted in 
termination of the IPR proceedings. Roughly fifteen percent of all IPR petitions filed 
were ultimately settled between the petitioner and the patent holder. See Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board AIA Progress: Statistics (as of Jan. 8, 2015), U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE 2–3, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_ 
statistics_01_08_2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (noting 340 settlements out of 
2323 total petitions). 
115 Dolin, supra note 29, at 928 n.335 (“Again, the number of observations is 
small (thirteen out of 163 decisions involved patents that have previously prevailed 
in reexamination), and therefore the great disparity in percentages does not indicate 
a great disparity in raw numbers. Nonetheless, it does not appear either from the 
numbers or from reading the PTAB's decisions that prior reexaminations have had 
much effect on the outcome of the IPR. Additionally, occasionally patent challengers 
have filed both IPR requests and ex parte reexamination requests in hopes of 
prevailing in at least one forum.”). 
116 Id. at 928. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 929. 
119 See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e do not permit courts to redraft claims.”). 
120 Dolin, supra note 29, at 929. 
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has only granted such motions twice.121  One of these granted 
motions to amend yielded no opposition brief from the 
petitioner.122  Thus, it seems that another aspect of IPR 
proceedings swings in favor of the petitioner because “[w]hat was 
meant to be the counter-balance to the [petitioner]’s lower burden 
of proof in practice does not exist.”123 
The popularity of IPR proceedings has led many litigants to 
request the federal district courts to stay litigation pending the 
final decision of the IPR.124  Through staying litigation, the 
parties hope to resolve their disputes through the faster, less 
expensive IPR proceeding.125  In ruling on a request to stay 
litigation, a federal district court judge will usually balance three 
factors: “(1) whether a stay will unduly prejudice or present a 
clear tactical disadvantage to the nonmoving party, (2) whether a 
stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case, and 
(3) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has
been set.”126
Since the inception of IPR proceedings in 2012, there have 
been more than 170 motions to stay litigation.127  Federal district 
courts grant these motions at an average rate above seventy 
percent.128  When the parties disagree on the motion, the grant 
rate is about sixty percent, but when the parties agree, the grant 
rate is nearly ninety-eight percent.129 
121 See Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc. v. United States., No. IPR2013-00124, 
2014 WL 2120542, at *10 (P.T.A.B. May 20, 2014) (Final Written Decision); Tandus 
Flooring, Inc. v. Interface, Inc., No. IPR2013-00333, 2014 WL 6983455, at *32 
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2014) (Final Written Decision). 
122 Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 2014 WL 2120542, at *1. 
123 Dolin, supra note 29, at 929. 
124 Aashish Kapadia, Inter Partes Review: A New Paradigm in Patent Litigation, 
23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 113, 125 (2015). 
125 Id. 
126 Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D. 
Tex. 2005) (citing Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D.N.Y. 
1999)). Additionally, the Federal Circuit has advised against granting both a 
preliminary injunction and a motion to stay in the same case. See Procter & Gamble 
Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that both 
preliminary injunctions and motions to stay depend on whether there is a 
“substantial issue of patent validity”). 
127 Kapadia, supra note 124, at 131. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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C. Inter Partes Review in Practice
Through its decisions, the PTAB demonstrates willingness, if
not a desire, to invalidate patents.  For example, in Microsoft 
Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,130 the PTAB invalidated eleven claims of 
Proxyconn’s challenged patent.131  On September 18, 2012, 
Microsoft petitioned for IPR of claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, and 
24 of U.S. Patent No. 6,757,717 (“the ‘717 Patent”), then on 
January 11, 2013, Microsoft filed another petition for IPR of 
claims 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, and 14 of the ‘717 Patent.132  After the 
PTAB granted IPRs to review all challenged claims, Microsoft 
moved for joinder, which the PTAB granted.133  All challenged 
claims were challenged on both novelty and obviousness 
grounds.134 
The ‘717 Patent described a system for data access in a 
packet switched network, consisting of a sender/computer and a 
receiver/computer that communicate through the network.135  
The ‘717 Patent “provide[d] a way to reduce the amount of 
redundant data transmitted over a network.”136  The PTAB 
applied the broadest reasonable claim construction standard to 
interpret six claim terms.  First, the PTAB determined that “data 
access” referred to the freedom or ability to obtain or use data.137  
Second, the PTAB interpreted “permanent storage memory” to 
mean “any non-volatile memory that supports multiple write 
operations.”  Third, the PTAB concluded that “sender/computer” 
means “a computer that sends data,” “receiver/computer” means 
“a computer that receives data,” and that each respective 
computer “can encompass multiple devices including 
intermediaries.”138  Fourth, the PTAB concluded that the term 
“gateway . . . connected to said packet-switched network in such 
a way that network packets sent between at least two other 
computers pass through it[]” did not “limit which computers may 
constitute the ‘two other computers’ between which the gateway 
130 Nos. IPR2012-00026, IPR2013-00109, 2014 WL 721998, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 
19, 2014). 
131 Id. at *34. 
132 Id. at *1. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at *5. 
135 Id. at *2. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at *6. 
138 Id. at *8. 
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is connected.”139  Fifth, the PTAB determined that the “means for 
comparison between digital digests” refers to a structure that can 
compare any digital digest received from the network with any 
other digital digest.140  Finally, the PTAB concluded that 
“ ‘searching for data with the same digital digest in said network 
cache memory’ requires an ability to identify a particular data 
object with the same digital digest from a set of potentially many 
data objects stored in the network cache memory.”141 
Applying these claims constructions to the prior art, the 
PTAB determined that Microsoft established by a preponderance 
of evidence that claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 22, and 23 
were unpatentable due to anticipation, and that claims 1, 3, and 
10 were unpatentable due to obviousness.142  Additionally, the 
PTAB determined that Microsoft’s challenge to claims 6, 7, 9, 11, 
12, and 14 on the grounds of obviousness in light of combined 
prior art was moot; they were cancelled because they were 
anticipated by one of the prior art references relevant to the 
obviousness challenge.143 
Following the PTAB’s final written decision, Proxyconn 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.144  First, Proxyconn challenged the PTAB’s construction 
of the phrase “gateway . . . connected to said packet-switched 
network in such a way that network packets sent between at 
least two other computers,” because Proxyconn argued that the 
“ ‘two other computers’ referred only to the sender/computer and 
the receiver/computer.”145  The court, in light of the language of 
the claims and specification, agreed with Proxyconn’s 
construction and found the PTAB’s construction to be 
“unreasonably broad.”146  The court vacated and remanded the 
PTAB’s findings as to claims 6, 7, and 9 because they were based 
on an unreasonably broad construction of the term.147 
139 Id. at *9. 
140 Id. at *9–10. 
141 Id. at 10. 
142 Id. at 34. 
143 Id. at 16–17, 26. 
144 Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
145 Id. at 1298. 
146 Id. at 1299. 
147 Id. 
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Additionally, Proxyconn challenged the PTAB’s construction 
of the terms “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer,” arguing 
that they should be limited to just those two computers.148  Again, 
the court analyzed the language of the claims and the 
specification and agreed with Proxyconn’s construction, finding 
the PTAB’s construction unreasonably broad.149  Because the 
PTAB’s determination that claims 1, 3, 10, 22, and 23 were 
unpatentable was based on an unreasonably broad construction, 
the court vacated and remanded the PTAB’s findings as to claims 
1, 3, 10, 22, and 23.150 
On remand, the PTAB again concluded that claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 
9, 10, 22, and 23 of the ‘717 Patent were unpatentable.151  
Addressing the obviousness challenges to claims 6, 7, and 9 that 
it found moot in the initial IPR, the PTAB found “that the 
Federal Circuit’s instruction that the gateway be separate from 
the [two] ‘other’ computers . . . [was] met by the combination of” 
prior art.152  Hence, the PTAB concluded that claims 6, 7, and 9 
were unpatentable because they would have been obvious over 
the prior art.153  Likewise, the PTAB used the Federal Circuit’s 
construction of “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer” to 
again find that claims 1, 3, and 10 were unpatentable because 
they were obvious over prior art.154  Additionally, the PTAB used 
the Federal Circuit’s construction of “receiver/computer” to again 
find that claims 22 and 23 were unpatentable due to anticipation 
by prior art.155 
Although this case was the first time the Federal Circuit 
reversed and remanded an IPR final written decision, it 
demonstrates the potential effectiveness of IPR.  Under two very 
different claim constructions, the PTAB found that Microsoft met 
its evidentiary burden to invalidate Proxyconn’s patent claims. 
Perhaps this means that Proxyconn’s patent was indeed weak 
and deserved to be invalidated.  If so, cases such as this justify 
148 Id. at 1299–1300. 
149 Id. at 1300. 
150 Id. 
151 Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., Nos. IPR2012-00026, IPR2013-00109, 
2015 WL 8536725, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2015). 
152 Id. at *5. 
153 Id. at *6. 
154 Id. at *6–7. 
155 Id. at *8. 
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the creation of IPR.  But Congress needs to make further changes 
to achieve its goal of eliminating weak patents while offering a 
viable alternative to federal district court litigation. 
III. HOW TO MAKE INTER PARTES REVIEW A MORE EFFECTIVE
PROCEEDING 
In many circumstances, the simplest solution is the greatest 
solution.  By creating IPR, Congress may have finally found a 
way to resolve the issue of weak patents.  By mandating patent 
challengers—or infringement defendants—to file for IPR 
whenever they challenge the validity of patent claims on novelty 
or obviousness grounds, and by making PTAB decisions binding 
on federal district courts, Congress would potentially eliminate 
weak patents while providing a faster, less expensive alternative 
to litigation. 
By forcing patent challengers to use IPR, the PTAB would 
have more opportunities to invalidate weak patents. 
Additionally, because the petitioner must demonstrate a 
reasonable likelihood of success before an IPR is instituted, a 
denial of IPR would be very instructive for a federal district 
court’s validity analysis.  By denying IPR, the PTAB is 
essentially telling the court that, based on the petitioner’s prior 
art references, the challenged patent claims are strong enough to 
survive IPR’s relaxed standards.  If the challenged patent claims 
are strong enough to survive IPR’s relaxed standards, they are 
certainly strong enough to survive federal litigation’s heightened 
standards.  Thus, the court could use the PTAB’s decision in 
place of its own validity analysis and move on with the trial. 
Conversely, if the PTAB institutes IPR and invalidates the 
challenged patent claims, then the federal litigation is likely 
resolved as well. 
To fully implement this proposal, Congress would have to 
mandate that the federal district courts stay litigation until IPRs 
are resolved and that the PTAB’s decisions are binding on the 
courts.  This would eliminate the possibility of parallel 
proceedings and ensure consistency in patent validity 
determinations. 
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CONCLUSION 
After several years in practice, IPR proceedings have, by 
themselves, proven to be faster and less expensive than federal 
litigation. However, when both IPR and litigation are allowed, 
prices soar.  Congress could give IPR the test of time or it could 
make periodic adjustments, like a pilot constantly making minor 
corrections to stay on course.  Increasing the frequency of IPR 
and making the PTAB’s decisions binding on federal district 
courts could be one such adjustment.  This adjustment could help 
make IPR a desirable alternative for dispute resolution, leading 
to time saved, costs reduced, and, potentially, a better way to 
solve the problem of weak patents.  Overall, the patent system 
would improve and Congress would fulfill its constitutional 
charge to promote scientific progress. 
